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Abstract 
In 2003, Gartner, Inc., predicted the inevitable demise of the intrusion detection 
(ID) market, a major player in the computer security technology industry.  In light of this 
prediction, IT executives need to know if intrusion detection technologies serve a 
strategic purpose within the framework of information assurance (IA).  This research 
investigated the historical background and circumstances that led to the birth of the 
intrusion detection field and explored the evolution of the discipline through current 
research in order to identify appropriate roles for IDS technology within an information 
assurance framework.  The research identified three factors contributing to the birth of ID 
including increased procurement and employment of resource-sharing computer systems 
in the DoD, a growing need to operate in an open computing environment while 
maintaining security and the unmanageable volume of audit data produced as a result of 
security requirements.  The research also uncovered six trends that could be used to 
describe the evolution of the ID discipline.  Finally, the research outlined three roles 
suitable for IDS to fulfill within the IA framework.
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AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE INTRUSION DETECTION DISCIPLINE AND ITS ROLE IN 
INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
   Background   
The concept of security in today’s world has become pervasive in all facets of 
life.  A large portion of the American workforce interfaces daily with computer systems 
through the use of email applications, word processing applications, spreadsheets, and 
presentation software.  With such widespread use of computing equipment, the idea of 
computer security has also become embedded in our society.  Ever since the 
Michelangelo virus of 1992, when computer users emptied the store shelves of 
commercial antiviral software (Anonymous, 2004), the developed world has cultivated a 
keen awareness of computer security issues. 
While most of us comprehend the concept of computer security, we still must 
wonder what the components are that make up a secure computer system?  Not too long 
ago, it seemed that the average PC owner needed only an updated virus scanner to keep 
their systems safe from malicious computer code.  Now, with the widespread use of 
“always-on” network connections, the average home computer is just as susceptible to 
attack by hackers as big corporations used to be.  Furthermore, if left unprotected, these 
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systems can be, in effect, taken over and employed as platforms for mounting attacks 
against other systems.  In light of this development, computer security experts are 
advising the average user to invest in a more robust security strategy that entails traffic 
filtering as well as virus protection.  If this is the case for the average computer user, 
what does it bode for corporate users who integrate their business operations using 
computing technologies.  As processing speeds and computational power increase, and as 
users progressively realize greater levels of interconnection, cyber-criminals are able to 
practice their trade with more ease and anonymity than ever before.  Furthermore, as 
organizations continue to capitalize on the efficiencies offered by the democratization of 
technology, it seems that the efficiencies are often overshadowed by catastrophic losses 
due to computer crime.  This leaves our information technology managers to ponder 
which tools at their disposal are genuinely effective against the threat of computer crime. 
The first line of defense against unwanted internet traffic is typically implemented 
in the form of firewall technologies which filter traffic according to specific rules based 
on the security policy of a given organization.  One author likens a firewall to a security 
guard in an office building or other secure facility (Rogers, 2002).  The guard uses 
various techniques to screen visitors and decide whether or not they are allowed to enter 
the facility.  The firewall is an excellent tool for filtering unwanted external traffic within 
a network environment.  However, according to the 1999 CSI/FBI Computer Crime 
Survey, 71 percent of respondents indicated unauthorized accesses by insiders.  Couple 
this information with the ability of skilled malefactors to circumvent firewall technology 
by exploiting vulnerabilities in commonly used services and you have a significant gap in 
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security strategy.  This is where intrusion detection (ID) potentially provides value.  
According to two security experts, “Intrusion detection systems remain the only proactive 
means of detecting and responding to threats that stem from both inside and outside a 
corporate network” (Innella & McMillan, 2001). 
While intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been increasingly incorporated 
into network security strategies since 1999 (Figure 1), the technology has come under fire 
recently for failing to deliver on its promises of tighter security.   
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In 2003, market research and consulting firm Gartner, Inc. released a scathing 
criticism of the technology claiming, “IDSs have failed to provide value relative to its 
costs and will be obsolete by 2005” (Gartner, 2003). While this analysis spurred a 
backlash by many IDS proponents, the Gartner report proposed a compelling argument 
for rethinking investment strategies in information security technology.  The supporting 
evidence provided by Gartner included: 
- Unmanageable volume of false positives and negatives 
- Increased burdens on IS organizations due to full-time monitoring 
requirements 
- A taxing incident-response process 
- Inability to monitor traffic rates greater than 600 Mbits/sec 
Furthermore, Gartner recommended diverting funds earmarked for IDS to state-of-the-art 
firewalls that bundle network and application-based defenses in a single solution as well 
as incorporate deep packet inspection and antivirus capabilities, effectively blocking 
malicious traffic before it has the opportunity to cause damage. 
This criticism came as quite a shock to many in the IT community as the IDS 
market had earned a significant share of the IT security market starting around 1998.  
Many large corporations, concerned with respect to protecting their information 
resources, invested significant capital in implementing commercial IDS products as part 
of their corporate security strategy.  Gartner’s conclusions, while not wholly accepted 
throughout the IT community, may have caused at least a few IT executives to reconsider 
their IDS investment.  This is especially true when the entire community of IDS users 
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have complaints consistent with those that Gartner brought to light, including IDS 
researchers. 
Intrusion detection, thus, has suffered from mixed views on its effectiveness in 
defending network resources.  This dichotomy of opinions leads to the purpose of this 
research and the problem that the researcher aims to shed light on. 
   Problem Statement   
Information systems (IS) and information technology (IT) executives need a 
strategic understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and underlying theory of detection 
for IDS technologies in order to make appropriate investment decisions regarding their 
use.  Furthermore, this understanding should be framed in the overarching strategy of 
information assurance (IA), as IA is the prevailing construct for securing information and 
information resources employed by IS/IT executives today. 
   Research Objectives   
In order to understand the capabilities and limitations of IDS, it is necessary to 
comprehend the path that the foundational IDS research has taken to build the existing 
body of knowledge.  Whether or not the discipline or its application has been rendered  
ineffective, it is important to know from whence the discipline emerged and under what 
circumstances.  Furthermore, it would be beneficial to enumerate the evolution of the IDS 
discipline thereby providing a strategic perspective on how IDS capabilities have grown 
in breadth and depth over time.  Finally, by enlightening the circumstances by which the 
IDS discipline emerged and observing the evolutionary patterns that guided development 
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of the discipline, it may be possible to determine those roles, in a holistic IA program, 
that this technology is suited to fulfill. 
   Research Focus   
Consequently, the primary focus of this research is to determine what value, if 
any, the ID function serves with respect to implementing a holistic information assurance 
program.  This will be accomplished by addressing three specific investigative questions. 
   Investigative Questions   
1. What factors led to the emergence of intrusion detection as a discipline? 
2. How has IDS research evolved since its inception? 
3. What specific roles, if any, are IDS’s suited to fulfill within a holistic 
information assurance program? 
   Methodology   
The proposed methodology for this research effort is the historical analysis.  As 
attested to by Leedy and Ormrod , the focus of historical research is not only to 
accumulate factual information, but to interpret those facts for some valuable contribution 
to the body of knowledge (2001).  Subsequently, the researcher will apply a systematic 
process of gathering and critiquing sources of data to obtain enlightenment about the 
causes, effects, or trends of past events that may result in a better understanding of 
current or future events. 
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   Limitations   
Limitations of this study include a lack of exposure to private sector operations 
and planning processes on the researcher’s part.  However, the researcher does have 
experience in maintaining and managing information technology for the United States 
Air Force as well as background in the strategic employment of IT.  Furthermore, the 
researcher is attempting to interpret a highly technical topic from a strategic perspective.  
As such, certain conclusions may not fully consider the range of technical capabilities 
currently available in the IDS marketplace.  Finally, due to the broad range of research 
within the IDS community, the researcher surveyed primarily seminal works in the 
discipline and well-cited surveys of available literature.  Thus, it’s possible that certain 
perspectives or approaches to intrusion detection have not been represented. 
   Implications   
The implications of this study are important primarily to those employed in the 
security of computers and computer networks.  IS/IT executives will gain the most 
benefit from the conclusions of this study as it aims to provide guidelines for employing 
intrusion detection systems within the context of an IA strategy.  While these 
implications may also be cross-utilized in the intrusion detection field as possible 
directions for further research, the objective is primarily to aid in the formulation and 
implementation of IT policy encompassing programming, architecting, organizing and 
budgeting for security and, ultimately, attainment of strategic advantage. 
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   Summary   
Chapter One provided background information to frame the context of this 
research and conveyed the problem that the proposed research methodology will be 
applied to.  This chapter also specified the primary objectives and investigative questions 
to be addressed throughout the course of the research as well as a brief overview of the 
historical research methodology.  Finally, this chapter introduced notional implications as 
well as limitations of the research presented in this thesis.  In Chapter Two, the researcher 
presents a review of the literature to address the research question. 
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II. Review of Relevant Literature 
 
   Chapter Overview   
Chapter One provided the background and description of the problem addressed 
by this research as well as a brief synopsis of the proposed historical analysis technique.  
This chapter explores the available literature to address the investigative questions posed 
in Chapter One.  The discipline of intrusion detection emerged from a greater problem of 
computer security.  As computer systems are primarily employed for the storage, 
processing and transfer of information, the requirement for computer security is 
paramount to safeguarding this valuable resource.  This chapter examines the backdrop of 
the general computer security problem from which intrusion detection emerged and then 
examines the evolution of the IDS discipline from its inception to current research in the 
field.  Finally, this chapter explores the IA construct in order to frame the discussion of 
IDS within an IA strategy. 
   The Emergence of the Problem   
The discipline of intrusion detection was borne out of the broader topic of 
computer security.  Hence, an analysis of those factors that brought about an interest in 
computer security should intuitively shed light on the subordinate discipline of intrusion 
detection. 
Many experts consider the Defense Science Board’s Task Force on Computer 
Security report entitled Security Controls for Computer Systems to be the first 
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concentrated effort to address the problem of computer security.  This report, commonly 
referred to as the “Ware report” in honor of the Task Force chairman, was originally 
published in February of 1970, and was republished in 1979 following declassification.  
The value of this report is evidenced by its inclusion in the list of seminal papers on 
computer security compiled by the Computer Security Laboratory within the Computer 
Science Department at the University of California, Davis. 
The Ware report initially traces the emergence of computer security as a serious 
area of concern to events which occurred during the spring and summer of 1967.  This 
report was prepared ultimately for the United States Department of Defense’s (DoD) 
Defense Science Board in response to increased anxiety by defense contractors and 
military operators over the lack of security safeguards present in resource-sharing 
systems, which were being acquired vigorously during this period (Ware, 1970). 
Resource-sharing systems essentially dole the resources of a computer system 
(memory, computational power, peripheral devices) among several concurrent users.  In 
the context of the Ware report, the term included time-sharing, multiprogrammed, remote 
batch, on-line, multi-access, and multiprocessing systems.  The primary difference 
between the various types was determined by the location of the user relative to the job 
entry platform when the computational task is being accomplished.  Time-sharing, on-
line, and multi-access systems required the user to interact with the system while the task, 
or job, is being performed.  Multiprogrammed and remote batch systems completed the 
job autonomously after the user specified the task and specific criteria for the job.  In 
multiprogrammed and remote batch environments, the system scheduled the job in a 
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queue and the user must retrieve the results at a later time.  Multiprocessing systems were 
a special case where the system possesses two or more processors which shared the 
system memory.  Typically, resource-sharing systems provided access to users via 
geographically separated consoles, or terminals connected to the central computer by 
communication lines (Ware, 1970).  These systems were precursors to today’s networks 
and client-server architectures. 
In June 1967, the Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
(Administration, Evaluation, and Management) contacted the Director of the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and formally requested a Task Force be formed to 
study and recommend hardware and software safeguards that would adequately shield 
classified information from inadvertent disclosure in a multi-access, resource-sharing 
computing environment.  The Task Force on Computer Security was formed in October 
following discussions with representatives from academic and industrial communities 
during the summer and fall of 1967.  The Task Force consisted of a Steering Group 
chaired by Mr. Willis H. Ware from the Rand Corporation as well as a Policy Panel and a 
Technical Panel reporting to the Steering Group.  Mr. Ware was an ex-officio member of 
both subordinate panels (Ware, 1970). 
In the report, the Task Force recognized that the basic problem of machine 
processing of classified information was not new, even in 1970.  The problems had been 
previously encountered in batch-processing mode and the more recent advances of 
remote job-entry systems where inadequate security mechanisms had been deliberately or 
inadvertently circumvented to allow access to sensitive information by unauthorized 
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users.  Still, the mechanisms employed to safeguard these systems had, for the most part, 
been modified versions of the well-known manual processes of protecting sensitive 
information.  Ware provided an example demonstrating that “the basic principle 
underlying the security of computer systems has traditionally been that of isolation—
simply removing the entire system to a physical environment in which penetrability is 
acceptably minimized” (Ware, 1970:1).   
The Task Force emphasized that the advent of resource-sharing systems, similar 
in many respects to today’s networks and client-server architectures, had compounded the 
problem and introduced more complexity to the situation.  The isolation technique was no 
longer robust to safeguarding sensitive information given the impossibility of physically 
securing systems in which some components, such as user access terminals, are 
geographically separated. 
In explaining the nature of the computer security problem, the Task Force 
recognized the perspective that the vulnerabilities of resource-sharing systems might be 
viewed as a trade-off for the efficiencies these systems have to offer (Ware, 1970).  This 
particular view is still pervasive today, but the Task Force felt that it obscured two more 
fundamental issues.  First, the problem of computer security is not limited to one or even 
a few types of computer systems or configurations; it maintains relevance irrespective of 
the platform.  Ware explained, “…we are really dealing not with system configurations, 
but with security” (1970:1).  The technology had served as a catalyst for shifting the 
focus from securing the hardware to protecting the information independent of the 
platform.  Secondly, the Task Force recognized that resource-sharing systems must be 
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designed from the very start with a fundamental focus on protecting information not only 
from other users but from the system itself (Ware, 1970). 
Herein lay the value of the Ware report.  It was the first serious effort at scoping 
the problem of computer security.  The Ware report established a lexicon for the 
computing community to begin discussing the issue of security (Anderson, 1972b).  At 
one level of abstraction, this report produced valuable observations within the frame of 
computer security, but many of these same conclusions are directly relevant to intrusion 
detection.  These conclusions were communicated through a series of recommendations 
and comments from each panel of the Task Force.  They encompassed specific 
characteristics that each panel believed should be included in a secure computer system.  
Additionally, these recommendations aided in shaping the efforts of at least one of the 
seminal researchers in intrusion detection.   
While the Policy Panel’s recommendations were broad in range and included 
topics such as personnel roles and responsibilities and information structures in a secure 
system, the panel also explicitly identified certain system capabilities which were 
required to maintain security in computing environments.  Those capabilities that, at least 
superficially, are relevant to the field of intrusion detection included system transaction 
accounting and reliability and auto-testing. 
The capability for system transaction accounting required that all significant 
transactions relevant to security occurring between the users and the system should be 
documented and automatically time stamped.  This capability would then allow for the 
creation of an audit trail that provided information about file accesses, modifications, 
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creation, destruction, classification, and reclassification.  This audit trail would be made 
available to security personnel who are, in turn, responsible for maintaining the integrity 
of the system.  Ware also suggested that the activities of system operators, administrators, 
and maintainer’s would be subject to the same level of monitoring, presumably to protect 
against insider threat issues (Ware, 1970). 
The reliability and auto-testing capability required that security controls be 
redundant as well as self-testing in order to reduce the probability of undetected 
compromise.  In addition to the built-in tests, security personnel should also be charged 
with periodically inspecting the protection mechanisms of the system.  When any of these 
mechanisms detect a security breach, the system should transition to a degraded mode of 
operation that ceases the flow of information between the system and the user 
community.  Once the threat of further information leakage has been averted, the 
system’s security personnel are notified and should attempt to resolve the breakdown of 
the protection mechanisms while adhering to well-documented procedures that maximize 
security as well as service to the users (Ware, 1970).  In making this recommendation, the 
Task Force implied at least a calculated response capability, if not automated responses to 
security breaches. 
The next section of the Ware report dealt with the technical considerations in 
maintaining computer security.  The Technical Panel, in introducing its 
recommendations, conceded: 
Present technology offers no way to absolutely protect information or the 
computer operating system itself from all security threats posed by the human 
beings around it.  As a consequence, procedural and administrative safeguards 
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must be applied in resource-sharing computer centers to supplement the 
protection available in the hardware and software (Ware, 1970:26). 
 
Even at this early stage in the study of computer security, the panel members admitted 
that technology alone was not capable of adequately securing the information resident in 
a computer system. 
The Technical Panel, of which James P. Anderson was a member and whose 
contributions to IDS will be discussed extensively later in this research, presented several 
technical enhancements that they claimed were necessary and sufficient for ensuring 
security in a closed environment.  The engineering-related recommendations pertaining 
specifically to the field of intrusion detection were in the areas of supervisor protection, 
system access control, terminal identification, and certification. 
The supervisor protection enhancement provided a mechanism which denied a 
user program the ability to penetrate the Supervisor, also called the operating system 
kernel, without the Supervisor detecting it (Ware, 1970).  The import of this 
recommendation is the implication that suspicious or anomalous activity within a system, 
such as normal users gaining access to privileged processes and functions, should raise 
attention by security mechanisms or personnel. 
Regarding system access control, the Technical Panel recommended a specific 
enhancement related to denial of access that is relevant to the intrusion detection 
discipline.  The panel recommended that the average user should not be able to gather 
information regarding the security controls or protection mechanisms emplaced when 
access is denied him, a common problem in many protection mechanisms.  The system 
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should assume inadvertence on the user’s part and assist in identifying any mistakes in 
negotiating protection mechanisms (Ware, 1970).  While this general guideline is 
important in security design, the correlation to ID resides in the panel’s expansion on the 
idea by further proposing that the system should also continue to log unsuccessful 
attempts to access sensitive files, processes and system functions, presumably to extract 
information regarding misuse.  This is important today as the use of intrusion detection 
systems for gathering forensic evidence in prosecuting computer crimes is both a popular 
and volatile issue.  On further expansion, the panel proposed that secure systems should 
have a means of positively identifying any terminals with which it is communicating and 
that the system should be able to request terminal identification at any time (Ware, 1970).  
Again, while this is a generally sound recommendation as far as security is concerned, in 
the context of intrusion detection this information could prove valuable in correlating 
penetration attempts. 
In the area of certification, the Technical Panel, echoing the Policy Panel’s 
proposal, proposed the generation and use of audit trails to ensure proper usage of the 
system.  However, the technical panel took this one step further by describing specific 
details that should be incorporated into the system audit (Ware, 1970).  While 
enumerating these details is outside the scope of this research, it is interesting to note this 
early effort at codifying specific audit data that would aid in maintaining computer 
security. 
Another notable comment about audit trail data made by the technical panel was 
that special data reduction programs, event-correlation programs, and data-summary 
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programs will be required by security personnel since a large volume of information will 
be available through the various logs (Ware, 1970).  This early observation foreshadowed 
the need for separate sensors and data correlation systems that dominate current IDS 
architectures. 
The Technical Panel also echoed the Policy Panel’s suggestion for security 
violation and auto-testing.  They proposed that any user activity that violated any security 
control, should result in the activity being immediately terminated and security personnel 
notified (Ware, 1970).  The panel members apparently advocated automated or active 
response mechanisms when designing secure systems, especially given the military 
context for which this report was compiled. 
Another interesting observation in the Ware report is its treatment of open and 
closed systems and the peculiarities of each when discussing security.  The panel 
prefaced their recommendations by acknowledging the existence of two distinct 
environments for the operation of secure systems—closed environments and open 
environments. A closed environment consists of cleared, or trusted, personnel operating 
physically protected terminals connected to a physically protected central system over 
physically protected communication lines.  An open environment is defined in the Ware 
report as a “mixture of uncleared users working at unprotected consoles connected to the 
computing central using unprotected communication circuits and cleared users with 
protected consoles and protected communication lines” (Ware, 1970:vi).   
The Technical Panel asserted that the open computing environment adds 
significant complexity to the problem of security.  The security problem with such an 
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open system is that it must be capable of negotiating penetration from within and without.  
The panel documented specific concerns about the risks inherent when sensitive 
(classified) information resides within an open system.  These concerns included:  
- It is virtually impossible to verify that a large software system is completely 
free of errors and anomalies 
- The state of system design of large software systems is such that frequent 
changes to the system can be expected 
- Certification of a system is not a fully developed technique nor are its details 
thoroughly worked out 
- System failure modes are not thoroughly understood, catalogued, or protected 
against 
- Large hardware complexes cannot be guaranteed error-free (Ware, 1970:26) 
While the panel suggested that the collective implementation of their 
recommendations would result in adequate security for a closed system, the panel could 
not guarantee the effectiveness of their recommendations within an open environment.  
Even with a cursory consideration of the security requirements of open systems, the Task 
Force simply could not predetermine the security implications of open systems.  This is 
mostly due to a lack of experience in dealing with the open environment.  After all, in 
1970, connectivity such as we enjoy today was unheard of.   
As stated previously, the recommendations from this study were the foremost to 
attack the fledgling issue of computer security; however, even in such an early attempt, 
the roots of the intrusion detection discipline had begun to materialize.   
   Developing a Plan of Attack   
In 1972, James P. Anderson, a former member of the Technical Panel of the 
Defense Science Board’s Task Force on Computer Security, was called upon to develop a 
plan of study for the U.S. Air Force to address the emergent issues that were identified by 
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the Ware report. The Ware report, he acknowledged in the executive summary, “was an 
important milestone but did not have the impact intended and may have had a negative 
effect due to its specification of necessary, but not sufficient, criteria for evaluating 
hardware and software suitable for secure operations” (Anderson, 1972a:4).  
Furthermore, Anderson explained that the expected result from the Task Force’s efforts 
was a recommended research and development program that would lead to the resolution 
of the computer security problem.  While the Ware report did not produce a valid 
research program to deal with computer security as was intended, the report was the first 
to properly frame the computer security problem which subsequently allowed further 
expansion on the topic (Anderson, 1972b).  Consequently, Anderson was commissioned 
to pick up where the Task Force left off.   
At the time, it seems that a significant portion of the high level decision makers 
may have been proponents of the “add-on” approach to security.  Anderson and his panel 
of researchers staunchly disagreed.  It was the strong opinion of the panel that solutions 
to this problem were not going to be solved by augmenting existing systems.  In fact, a 
central theme of the study is the idea that security must be designed into the system from 
the start.  He expanded, “the issue of computer security is one of completeness rather 
than degree, and a complete system will provide all of the controls necessary for a 
mixture of all security levels on a single system” (Anderson, 1972a:iv).   
The logic for this opinion was that in order to provide defense against a malicious 
user, the security mechanisms must be designed such that not only are the user’s actions 
under control but they should be capable of also controlling the various components of 
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the operating system when it is acting as an intermediary between the user and the 
information residing in the system (Anderson, 1972a).  In general, Anderson’s approach 
to solving this problem was to first formulate a sound theoretical model for a secure 
computing system and then progress toward an appropriate implementation. 
In addition to formulating a development plan for a prototype secure multi-level 
computer system, Anderson also formulated development plans for supporting 
technologies.  Of particular interest, in the scope of this research, is the proposed 
development of a Security Surveillance System found in the Exploratory Development 
Plan.  The Exploratory Development Plan was a subset of the overall plan comprised of 
semi-independent topics which indirectly supported the primary objective of the study.  
The objectives of the Security Surveillance System were:  
- To detect security-related events (i.e. system behavior which constitutes or 
precipitates security incidents or violations) 
- To collect, record, reduce and analyze data regarding event detections in order 
to invoke an appropriate compensatory procedure (e.g. exception processor, 
alarm or correction mechanism) 
- To generate reports for security personnel review and damage assessment 
(Anderson, 1972b:51) 
Anderson enumerated the particular areas of such a capability that should be 
focused on which included instrumentation, measurement, compensatory procedures, 
reporting and integrity.  “Instrumentation,” Anderson said, “was a two-fold problem” 
(Anderson, 1972b:51).  What should be detected and how should it be detected?  These 
questions are further complicated by the fact that all system events may be relevant, but 
not necessarily at the same time or in the same combination.  Measurement dealt with 
how the data is collected, recorded, reduced and analyzed to determine security 
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implications.  Compensatory procedures could be considered what we now refer to as 
incident response and deals with how systems and security personnel react when 
confronted with a breach in the protection mechanisms.  Reporting refers to presenting 
the collected data such that security personnel are able to intuitively recognize security 
incidents while also providing flexibility for thorough investigation of an incident.  
Integrity corresponds to those measures implemented to maintain the security of the 
surveillance system itself as well as measures present to prevent circumventing the 
security surveillance system (Anderson, 1972b).  According to McHugh, these issues are 
still at the heart of IDS research today (2001). 
   Audit in the 1970’s   
From 1972 – 1980, several computer security research initiatives were undertaken 
in the public sector with extensive funding from the DoD.  These efforts culminated with 
the DOD Security Initiative of 1977.  As a result of this initiative, audit capabilities were 
required in the DoD for resource-sharing systems containing sensitive information (Bace, 
2000).  The ADP Security Manual, articulated the following requirement in the early 
1970’s: “An audit log or file (manual, machine, or both) shall be maintained as a history 
of the use of the ADP [Automated Data Processing] System to permit a regular security 
review of system activity” (Department of Defense, 1973:38).  While the previous 
example shows one instance of audit capabilities being mandated in DoD computer 
systems, more sensitive environments placed greater demands on the audit capabilities of 
resource-sharing systems (National Computer Security Center, 1985). 
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MULTICS was the most secure operating system compared to its contemporaries 
and offered the greatest promise in supporting multilevel secure computing environment 
(Karger and Schell, 2002).  The changes in audit requirements for the MULTICS 
operating system illustrate a general trend in the use of audit functions as a security 
control.  According to Karger and Schell, MULTICS audit capability as of the release of 
the 1972 Security Evaluation was a careful audit of the logins/logouts of each user 
(1974).  Security enhancements proposed in 1973 at the Air Force Data Services Center 
expanded this audit capability to include: 
- Accesses to classified data and the nature of the access (per DoD 
5200.28-M) 
- Each login and logout 
- Unsuccessful login attempts and reason for rejection 
- Rejected accesses of information based on security restrictions 
and each illegal attempted use (fault) of access permission 
- All system faults which could indicate attempts to subvert the 
system or to exploit hardware failures 
- All security-related actions of the SSO or the SA 
- Each time a process awards itself extra privileges 
- All completed requests for printed or punched output 
- All tape mount requests for user tapes (Whitmore et al., 1973:80) 
In 1975, Neumann et al. proposed a secure operating system design which included audit 
capabilities in its standard functions (1975).  Still, a balance had to be struck between 
collecting too much audit data or not enough (Myers, 1980).   
   Intrusion Detection Is Born   
In 1980, the Air Force again commissioned James Anderson.  This time he was 
consulted to recommend improvements for the Air Force’s security audit capability at a 
particular site.  During this time, audit data was being manually analyzed.  With an 
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increase in usage of computing equipment, came a corresponding increase in audit data.  
Anderson found that this volume increase coupled with an incomplete and sometimes 
redundant audit trail data, led to excessive time spent on auditing activities. 
In laying a foundation for his discussion of audit trails, Anderson first provided a 
lexicon for discussing what he called a “security monitoring surveillance system” 
(Anderson, 1980: 4).    
Threat:  The potential possibility of a deliberate unauthorized attempt to: 
  a)  access information 
  b)  manipulate information 
  c)  render a system unreliable or unusable 
Risk:  Accidental and unpredictable exposure of information, or violation of 
operation integrity due to malfunction of hardware or incomplete or 
incorrect software design 
Vulnerability:  A known or suspected flaw in the hardware or software design or 
operation of a system that exposes the system to penetration or its 
information to accidental disclosure 
Attack:  A specific formulation or execution of a plan to carry out a threat 
Penetration:  A successful attack; the ability to obtain (unauthorized) access to 
files and programs or the control state of a computer system (Anderson, 
1980:4-5) 
Once a lexicon for investigating was introduced, Anderson pursued clarifying the 
“What should be detected?” question.  Anderson’s report proposed a threat taxonomy to 
understand the types of threats and attacks that could be mounted against a computer 
system and how these threats may manifest themselves in audit data.  Anderson identified 
three general cases of threats based on the attacker’s authority within the realm of the 
computer system (see Figure 2).   
In the representation, Anderson noted that attackers are classified not with respect 
to the organization owning the system but with their authorization on the computer 
system itself.  So, an external attacker may either be associated with the organization but 
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not authorized use of the computer system or the attacker could be a total outsider.  In 
today’s context of networks, this description could be extended to include individuals 
with access to the network, but not the target of the attack.  Anderson also noted that the 
first task of an external penetrator is, in fact, gaining access to the system.  Once access is 
gained, the threat is translated to an internal threat classification (Anderson, 1980). 
With respect to individuals authorized on the specific computer system (i.e. 
internal penetrators), Anderson further identifies attackers as masqueraders, legitimate 
users, or clandestine users. 
Masqueraders are those attackers who assume the identity of another user in order 
to carry out attacks.  It’s interesting to note that these users can be external penetrators 
who have assumed an identity internal to the system, or a legitimate user who has 
assumed an identity of another with malicious intent.  Anderson writes that the 
masquerader is “interesting because there is no particular feature to distinguish the 
masquerader from the legitimate user” (Anderson, 1980:11).  From the system’s 
perspective, the masquerader is a legitimate user.  As such, the masquerader is an “’extra’ 
use of the system by the unauthorized user” (Anderson, 1980:12).  Hence, audit trail 
records should be able to detect masqueraders by assimilating the following indices: 
- Use outside of normal time 
- Abnormal frequency of use 
- Abnormal volume of data reference 
- Abnormal patterns of reference to programs or data (Anderson, 
1980:12) 
In summary, masqueraders are identifiable by distinguishing abnormal usage of a system.  
This requires an assumption that those charged with security can discern normal usage. 
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Figure 2:  General Cases of Threats (Anderson, 1980:7) 
 
 
 
Legitimate users are those individuals who have authorized access to a system and 
its resources but who misuse that access for whatever purpose.  The degree of difficulty 
in detecting misfeasance by a legitimate user is greater in that no abnormal usage patterns 
may be present.  The only way to identify the legitimate user is if the attack involves 
accessing information that is normally not authorized, accessing large amounts of 
information, or other relatively excessive usage patterns (Anderson, 1980).  Again, 
detecting misfeasance by a legitimate user requires a previously established normal 
pattern of usage. 
The clandestine user as characterized by Anderson is probably the most difficult 
to detect because this user is capable of hiding malicious activities by gaining the greatest 
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level of control over the system.  Anderson felt that the ideal situation would be to 
provide independent audit trails for each major component of the system (1980).  It is 
much more complicated to suppress auditing at multiple nodes in a networked 
environment.  Conversely, analysis of audit trails from multiple systems is more difficult 
for security personnel (Anderson, 1980). 
In addition to classifying internal intruders, Anderson also provided a framework 
for characterizing computer usage based on the parameters of time and dataset and 
program usage for individual users.  Group statistics were used as a parameter for those 
systems requiring monitoring of particularly sensitive files and devices.  Anderson 
proposed that correlating data between users and as a group would provide more 
granularity for what constitutes abnormal behavior.  Anderson also proposed 
incorporating these data reduction techniques into an automated system which would 
alert system security officers when clear violation of system security policy or abnormal 
activity occurred (1980).  This report served as a platform for the first IDS prototypes 
developed at SRI International and TRW. 
   An Intrusion Detection Model   
From 1984 to 1986, Dorothy Denning and Peter Neumann, while employed with 
SRI, modeled a real-time intrusion detection system, called the Intrusion Detection 
Expert System (IDES), funded by the US Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (SPAWAR).  Taking the next step with Anderson’s ideas, this model 
correlated anomalous activity with misuse using statistical analysis techniques.  As such, 
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Denning’s 1987 paper, “An Intrusion Detection Model”, is one of the seminal works in 
the IDS discipline (Bace, 2000). 
In Denning’s paper, she describes the model as “being based on the hypothesis 
that exploitation of a system's vulnerabilities involves abnormal use, of the system; 
therefore, security violations could be detected from abnormal patterns of system usage” 
(1987: 1).  Denning’s model contains six components:  subjects, objects, audit records, 
profiles, anomaly records, and activity rules.  The model is based on creating profiles of 
normal behavior using statistical measurements to express the interaction between system 
subjects (users) and system objects (files, commands, devices, etc.).  The profiles are 
compared to audit records to identify anomalous behavior and update the user’s profile if 
necessary.  When anomalous activity is identified, anomaly records are created.  The 
model also includes activity rules that dictate the actions of the system in response to a 
stimulus, such as triggering a system alarm or generating a report when some predefined 
condition is satisfied.  Denning considered the possibility that user behavior might 
change over time and included both static (long term measurements) and dynamic (short 
intervals) characteristics in the structure of profiles (1987).   
Furthermore, the profiling mechanism had the capability of aggregating individual 
user profiles to create classes of users. This enabled the discovery of users whose 
behavior was internally consistent, but abnormal with respect to users with similar duties 
on the target system (Bace, 2000). 
Between 1986 and 1992, Denning and Neumann’s model was implemented in the 
IDES prototype at SRI International.  One key feature of the IDES prototype was the 
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capability to alter a user’s profile over time, based on changing usage patterns.  While the 
ability to change a user’s profile over time minimized the number of false alarms 
generated by the system, it also introduced the risk that a skilled hacker may gradually 
condition his own profile to defeat the system.  In order to diminish this risk, a hybrid 
analysis scheme was adopted by the IDES development team which included an anomaly 
detector and an expert system.  The anomaly detector employed the previously described 
statistical techniques to identify abnormal usage patterns.  The expert system utilized a 
rule-based methodology to detect previously discovered attack patterns (Bace, 2000).   
Henceforth, a dichotomy would emerge in the discipline of intrusion detection.  
Anomaly detection, as it has come to be known, involves the aforementioned statistical 
profiling techniques to discern abnormal user behavior from normal behavior.  Signature 
detection (also called misuse detection) involves pattern-matching operations that search 
the audit logs for entries matching a predefined description of intrusive activity.  The 
IDES prototype spurred a myriad of research IDS systems in the next decade, but most of 
them would employ only one of the two analysis schemes introduced in the IDES 
prototype (Bace, 2000).   
   IDS in the late 1980’s   
Many IDS systems were developed in the late 1980’s subsequent to the landmark 
research completed at SRI.  Each was significant in advancing the field of intrusion 
detection in its own way.  Following is a sample of those systems along with notable 
accomplishments associated with each beginning with the Discovery system developed at 
TRW, the forerunner to the Experian credit reporting agency. 
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Discovery was an expert system for detecting problems in TRW’s online credit 
database.  This system was notable primarily because it could be considered the first 
application-based IDS system.  Discovery was different from its contemporaries in that it 
monitored a database application for malicious behavior rather than an operating system.  
The purpose of the system was based on identifying three classes of abuse:  unauthorized 
access, insider misuse, and invalid transactions.  Discovery was funded and designed 
internally at TRW (Bace, 2000). 
Haystack was a system developed for the US Air Force’s Cryptologic Support 
Center initially by Tracor Applied Sciences, Inc. from 1987 to 1989 which was renamed 
Haystack Labs and continued the project from 1989 to 1991.  The goal for Haystack was 
to aid security officers in detecting misuse of the Air Force’s Standard Base Level 
Computers (SBLC).  The SBLC were mainframes running early 1970’s vintage operating 
systems and used for a myriad of tasks such as accounting, finance, inventory control, 
and personnel functions.  The data residing in these systems was considered “sensitive 
but unclassified.”  These systems generated audit trails for over a million events per week 
(Bace, 2000).   
The Haystack system was notable because it utilized an Oracle database 
management system (DBMS) to organize the audit trail data prior to analysis, as did later 
versions of IDES.  Haystack performed audit trail analysis in batch mode.  This meant 
that the system downloaded and analyzed audit data from the target system at regular 
intervals.  As such, Haystack did not perform real-time intrusion detection, but was 
significant as it did monitor several geographically separated systems (Bace, 2000).  
29 
 
According to Innella, Haystack performed its analysis by comparing audit data with 
predefined patterns (2001).  Axelsson also supports this, but added that Haystack 
incorporated both signature and anomaly detection in its analysis (2000a).  The system 
earned its name purportedly because searching through the enormous volume of audit 
data for evidence of intrusion was like “looking for a needle in a haystack” (Innella, 
2001). 
The next important IDS development was the Multics Intrusion Detection and 
Alerting System (MIDAS).  MIDAS monitored the National Computer Security Center’s 
Dockmaster system.  Dockmaster was a resource facility for computer security that 
serviced the NSA, its vendors, academia, and other government agencies.  Dockmaster 
provided e-mail and discussion services for its users using the early infrastructure of 
today’s Internet (Axelsson, 2000a).  While similar to other contemporary systems in its 
employment of a hybrid analysis mechanism, MIDAS was important due to its status as 
the first IDS responsible for an operational system connected to the Internet (Bace, 2000). 
The next major evolution in the intrusion detection field was the use of 
nonparametric statistical techniques for anomaly detection.  This approach was 
implemented in a system called Wisdom and Sense by the Safeguards and Security 
Group at Los Alamos National Laboratory.  Wisdom and Sense was developed to provide 
security for U.S. Department of Energy mainframes in several facilities.  The use of 
nonparametric statistical mechanisms is significant because these techniques make no 
assumptions about the distribution of the data.  In Wisdom and Sense, the nonparametric 
analyses were performed on archived audit data to formulate the rule base that 
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characterized normal activity.  New activity was then compared to the rule base and 
deviations were catalogued.  Another important feature of Wisdom and Sense is the 
capability for system administrators to augment the automated rule generation with 
tailored rules based on their specific knowledge of the system and its vulnerabilities 
(Bace, 2000).  Wisdom and Sense suffered from many of the same shortcomings as other 
anomaly detectors of the era which included identifying appropriate data during the 
learning phase which was known to contain no intrusion activity, high false positives, and 
system memory limitations were insufficient to support expansive rule bases (Vaccaro & 
Liepins, 1989). 
Up to this point, only host-based IDS systems had been developed, that is, they 
analyze data internally generated by a single system.  Even in the case of Haystack, 
where several similar systems were being monitored, the detector proper performed 
analysis for only one of the systems at a time.  The data was not correlated across the 
target systems.  The next notable accomplishment in the evolution of ID systems is the 
Network System Monitor (NSM) at the University of California at Davis’s Lawrence 
Livermore Labs.  The emergence of the NSM marked the introduction of network traffic 
monitoring as the primary data source for intrusion data.  All previous attempts at 
intrusion detection analyzed audit trails generated by the host operating system’s internal 
security mechanisms or by keystroke monitoring mechanisms (Bace, 2000). 
NSM accomplished network traffic monitoring by placing network interface 
hardware into promiscuous mode.  This special operating mode allows the associated 
interface hardware to capture all the data traversing the transmission medium regardless 
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of the actual destination.  By focusing on the network traffic, rather than internally 
generated audit trails, NSM was the first IDS that could be implemented in a 
heterogeneous computing environment (Bace, 2000).  In other words, a single NSM 
platform could be employed to monitor systems running MS-DOS, Unix, or any variety 
of operating system so long as the system employed supported communication protocols 
and services, such as TCP/IP. 
The NSM system was subjected to a rigorous two-month test where it monitored 
more than 110,000 connections on the Livermore Labs local area network (LAN) and 
appropriately identified 300 of those connections as intrusive activity.  While NSM 
ascertained over 300 specific instances of misfeasance, the system administrators 
discovered less than one percent of abuses employing traditional manual methods (Bace, 
2000).  
 The success of the NSM ultimately altered the IDS paradigm from host-generated 
audit trails to network traffic analysis.  Most commercial systems used today rely on 
network traffic as their primary, if not sole, source of data.  On a similar note, however, 
the creators of the NSM pointed out that a holistic approach to computer security would 
employ both network and host-based intrusion detection strategies (Heberlein et al., 
1990).  Furthermore, the developers of the NSM, employed both anomaly detection and 
misuse detection techniques in their analysis mechanisms, a trend which has continued 
throughout the evolution of IDS’s to some degree. 
As alluded to previously, the NSM marked the expansion of the IDS field from 
the host environment to the network environment.  Also during this time, the internet 
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began experiencing significant increases in interconnectivity and bandwidth.  Due to the 
exploitation of vulnerabilities such as the Morris worm of 1988, there arose an equally 
drastic increase in concern over computer security and an increase in research and 
development funding in both the academic and commercial environments.  These exploits 
also brought about the creation of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) by 
DARPA (McHugh, 2001).  This brings us to the next major evolution of intrusion 
detection, the Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS).   
The DIDS initiative was the first integration of host and network-based intrusion 
detection capabilities.  The importance of DIDS is reflected in the large-scale support and 
funding it received from three government agencies:  the U.S. Air Force, the National 
Security Agency, and the U.S. Department of Energy (Bace, 2000).  The development 
team was a virtual “Who’s Who in Intrusion Detection?”  The team was comprised of 
many of the same minds who developed the NSM and Haystack. 
Initially, DIDS was conceptualized as an aggregation of the techniques employed 
in the NSM and Haystack to detect intrusive behavior.  However, the principal feature 
was to provide a centralized control and reporting console for system administrators.  In 
order to accomplish this, DIDS overcame significant challenges.  The first of which is 
tracking users and files in a networked environment.  Intruders often exploit the 
interconnectedness of other systems as a platform for masquerade.  In order to combat 
this, DIDS became the first system able to track users and objects (e.g., files) in the 
context of a networked environment.  Another issue overcame by DIDS was that of 
correlating events from different layers of abstraction within a system.  The designers 
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utilized a six-layer model where each layer was the result of a transformation applied to 
the raw data (Snapp et al., 1992).  By overcoming these two key issues, DIDS became the 
first integrated tool for collecting and correlating evidentiary data relating to computer 
misuse (Bace, 2000).  This is a key feature of today’s IDS systems as they are often used 
as forensic tools for criminal investigation of computer crime. 
The late 80’s and early 90’s also witnessed the birth of intrusion detection as a 
commercial product.  While the systems themselves were not markedly different from 
those being prototyped in the research environment, it is noteworthy to chronicle the 
emergence of a market for IDS products.  Three notable commercial products introduced 
during this period were ComputerWatch by AT&T, the Information Security Officer’s 
Assistant (ISOA) by PRC, Inc. and Audit developed by Clyde Digital.  ComputerWatch 
was an analysis tool for audit trail data with limited intrusion detection capability.  AT&T 
made the product commercially available for a short time and then ComputerWatch was 
restricted to an internal resource for AT&T’s consulting services group.  ISOA was 
implemented in the UNIX environment and provided automated and interactive audit trail 
reduction and analysis.  Audit scanned audit trails from Digital Equipment Corporation’s 
VAX/VMS operating systems for anomalous activity and ranked and reported users 
based on their level of suspected misuse (Bace, 2000).  It is interesting to note that Clyde 
Digital eventually became Axent, which is now owned by Symantec.  Symantec entered 
into the commercial IDS market by acquiring the Intruder Alert (host-based) and 
NetProwler (network-based) technologies from Axent (Innella, 2001). 
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   Surveys of IDS Research   
Since the birth of intrusion detection as a viable commercial market in the mid-
1990’s, IDS has grown to a major information security market, amassing $382 million in 
worldwide annual revenue in 2002, according to a press release from Infonetics Research 
(2003).  This same report extrapolated market growth to the $1.6 billion level by 2006. 
In spite of the apparent commercial success of intrusion detection systems in 
recent years, both researchers and end users of IDS technology have identified gaps in the 
current body of research which manifest themselves as shortfalls in operational systems.  
These shortfalls are most evident in the high false alarm rates of ID systems and the 
proprietary designs of many ID systems that fail miserably in their interoperability with 
other ID systems and security products.   
A few researchers have attempted to survey the IDS literature and provide 
guidance for further development of the technology.  Lunt described the prototype 
systems at the time which included IDES, MIDAS, Discovery and others as well as 
summarizing their respective detection approaches.  She concluded the survey with the 
insight that a successful IDS “should incorporate several different approaches” and 
implied that IDS security was of some concern (Lunt, 1988:15). 
In 2000, Allen et al. also surveyed the ID field and formulated a series of 
challenges to current ID systems.  These challenges can be summarized as follows: 
- Increase in number, variety, and sophistication of attacks 
- Ubiquity of strong encryption which hinders network IDS’s 
- Need for interoperability and correlation of security data from heterogeneous 
infrastructure 
- Ever-increasing network traffic with respect to volume and speed, coupled 
with proliferation of network switching systems 
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- Lack of widely accepted terminology and foundational concepts in ID 
- Security of intrusion detection systems from tampering 
- Poor security design of common operating environments 
- Absence of formal procedures and testbeds for objective evaluation of ID 
systems 
- Unacceptably high levels of false positives and false negatives (Allen et al., 
2000) 
 
The report went on to make recommendations to sponsors, users, vendors and researchers 
to address the gamut of issues facing the IDS community.   
One of the more compelling recommendations included a call to both vendors and 
researchers to focus more energy into cross-platform correlation of data coupled with 
diverse detection approaches, or data fusion.  Most current commercial systems use 
primarily misuse detection approaches (i.e. pattern matching).  Others support both 
network and host-based intrusion detection, or hybrid IDS, but fail to correlate the 
diagnoses from the two components.  Allen et al. felt that research into data fusion would 
significantly reduce high false alarm rates that are common in current IDS systems 
(2000). 
Along the same lines, the authors felt that research efforts in ID should focus on 
the foundational questions in the discipline.  What should be detected?  How should we 
detect it?  To quote them,  
“We believe this should be a wake-up call to the research community. Research efforts in 
the intrusion detection field have focused increasingly on building ID frameworks that 
address higher level issues and abstractions. We believe that these efforts should, in great 
part, be redirected to address the fundamental issues of minimizing false alarms and 
quantitative testing of the resulting algorithms. If the false alarm issue is not resolved, all 
the frameworks in the world will not help. (Allen et al., 2000:79)” 
 
Another major theme was that of evaluating IDS systems and signatures.  Some 
problems found in evaluations of commercial products were of such a basic nature that 
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there was a question whether the vendor performed any in-depth testing of the system at 
all.  The implication is that vendors are riding the IDS bandwagon to success with little 
justification for the advertised effectiveness of their products.  The authors recommended 
that the IDS research community explore methodologies for testing IDS systems and also 
proposed that vendors publicly release their attack signatures to scrutiny, much like the 
anti-viral community which has flourished under this model.  Thus, the signatures created 
would be quickly disseminated as well as robust to new attacks soon after they appear 
(Allen et al., 2000). 
Sill another recommendation expanded on the idea of utilizing IDS systems in 
gathering and collecting forensic evidence.  Allen et al. stated that IDS technologies 
possess vast potential in forensic evidence collection as they are capable of “time-lining 
suspicious activities such as network scans, login attempts and document modifications” 
(2000:82).  Currently, the false alarm problem remains a confounding variable to 
employing IDS in this fashion.  While IDS remains useful as a platform for investigation, 
maintaining the chain-of custody and insuring against evidence tampering require the use 
of traditional manual evidence collection processes in order to provide legally admissible 
evidence. 
McHugh echoed many of these very same sentiments in his brief survey of the 
field in a 2001 analysis of the intrusion detection discipline.  He concluded that the 
central issues in resolving detection accuracy rested on two assumptions made during 
early work in the field that continue to manifest themselves in current approaches.  The 
first is that intrusions would manifest themselves in such a way that the presence of an 
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attack is obvious and could be codified in such a way to allow for easy detection.  The 
other assumption was that any activity outside of “normal” activity is a strong indicator 
of intrusive behavior (McHugh, 2001). 
McHugh proposed two lines of research that he believed would help in clearing 
up these foundational issues in the ID field.  First, he proposed research in characterizing 
“normal” behavior.  By modeling normal behavior, it would make designing anomaly 
detectors much easier since they are based on identifying activity that is outside of 
declared or learned norms for computing behavior.  The second proposed line of 
research, strongly related to the first, involves formulating a credible theory for intrusive 
behavior (McHugh, 2001). 
These proposals borrow from the general signal detection theory (see Figure 3).  
A study by Axelsson explored the connective threads between the classical detection 
theory and intrusion detection.  In classical detection theory, two signals are present.  In 
order to carry out detection, the detector should be able to distinguish both signals in 
order to accurately carry out its objective.  In the context of intrusion detection and 
currently employed detection approaches, the detectors operate with information on only 
one of the signals.  In the anomaly detection approach, at the most fundamental level, the 
intrusion detection system possesses knowledge of the “noise” and detects that which is 
not noise.  Similarly, in misuse detection, the intrusion detection system possesses partial 
knowledge of the signal (since not all possible attacks are known) and reacts when that 
signal is detected.  He concluded, “If we wish to classify our source behaviour 
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correctly…knowledge of both distributions of behaviour will help us greatly when 
making the intrusion detection decision” (Axelsson, 2000b:9).  It is interesting to 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Classical Detection Theory (Axelsson, 2000b) 
 
note that in either approach, the detector operates with only partial knowledge of the 
signal it’s trying to detect.  This is because research has not sufficiently defined normal 
behavior nor intrusive behavior to a sufficient degree to alleviate the false alarm problem. 
Axelsson also produced a survey and taxonomy of intrusion detection systems 
which noted interesting trends in both research and commercial ID systems being 
developed.  The author noted that current trends in the discipline included active 
response, IDS security, and interoperability among intrusion detection systems, trends 
also alluded to by Allen et al. (2000).  In addition, Axelsson identified a general trend 
toward distributed intrusion detection systems rather than a centralized management and 
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analysis platform, adding that this trend followed a more general trend in the computing 
environment (2000a). 
Lundin and Jonsson produced a similar survey in 2002.  The authors specified 
four areas as the most important to the advancement of the field.  Those areas were:  
- Classifying intrusions - without a tried and true methodology for classifying 
intrusions or classes of intrusions, it is impossible to determine what data is 
needed to detect them 
- Effective data collection - the research community must define in detail what 
data must be collected to allow detection and devise methodologies for 
collecting the data efficiently 
- Data visualization (a.k.a. alarm reporting) - security personnel must have an 
acceptable interface for viewing and exploring the intrusion data 
- Methodology for generating test data - must be easier and automated to allow 
for robust evaluations of new systems (Lundin & Jonsson, 2002:34-35) 
They arrived at the conclusion that most effort was being placed into agent-based 
intrusion detection and the development of IDS evaluation testbeds.  Also mentioned in 
the report was the increased interest in shoring up security for intrusion detection systems 
and to active response capabilities (Lundin & Jonsson, 2002).  Still, while the research 
community drives some aspects of the intrusion detection discipline, the commercial 
market also helps to drive advances in the field based on customer desires.   
   IDS Market Trends   
Recent forecasts for the IDS market show a significant interest in a new 
generation of intrusion technologies coined intrusion detection and prevention systems 
(IDP), or intrusion prevention systems (IPS).  The feature that overtly distinguishes 
intrusion prevention is the capability to automate responses to intrusive behavior.  
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Possible scenarios include simply stopping certain types of traffic much like a firewall, or 
redirecting the traffic to a safe destination for further surveillance. 
Some of the top vendors have begun deploying solutions that consolidate and 
integrate many of the major security technologies into a single appliance that can be 
strategically inserted into existing network architectures.  These appliances typically have 
consolidated IDS/IPS technology with firewall, antivirus, and/or vulnerability assessment 
technologies.  Figure 4 illustrates the recent flattening in revenues for traditional IDS 
products while in-line IDS appliances are on the rise and expected to surpass the 
traditional implementations in the future.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Worldwide IDS/IPS Product Revenue Breakdown by Year (Infonetics 
Research, 2004) 
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Another current trend in security is that of utilizing the packet inspection 
capabilities of IDSs as a policy enforcement tool for corporate firewalls.  This 
implementation places the sensor beyond the “safe” region, or DMZ, which is the buffer 
zone between the firewall and the Internet.  By placing the IDS outside the firewall, 
analysts are able to ensure that firewalls are, in fact, configured according to the 
corporate security policy.  Since numerous manifestations of malicious code utilize 
common protocols such as HTTP and FTP to defeat firewall rules, IDS systems can 
identify many of these attacks and trigger a quicker response from administrators.  
By examining the historical background surrounding the emergence and evolution 
of the intrusion detection discipline, it’s clear that the research covers a broad range of 
topics and issues within the realm of computer security.  It is also clear that while this 
huge body of research exists, the application is lacking due to significant gaps in the 
foundations of the discipline.  However, what lies at the heart of this research is whether 
IDS has a place within an information assurance program.  In order to reach any 
reasonable conclusion regarding the role of IDS in information assurance, an examination 
of the information assurance literature is necessary to set up a framework for addressing 
intrusion detection in the context of IA. 
   Information Assurance   
One of the earliest appearances of the term “information assurance” was in Joint 
Publication 3-13 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations published by the Department 
of Defense to define concepts for utilizing information in the military environment.  It 
was defined in this publication as those measures  
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“that protect and defend information systems by ensuring their availability, 
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes 
providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, 
detection, and reaction capabilities” (Department of Defense, 1998:I-9).   
IA in the DoD, is considered a subset of defensive information operations and according 
to Air Force doctrine encompasses what was once known as INFOSEC (information 
security) (Department of the Air Force, 2002).  As many military concepts are adapted to 
meet private sector needs, the concept of IA also followed this model and is now a widely 
accepted construct in both private and public sector organizations.  
 
 
Figure 5: Information Assurance (Department of Defense, 1998) 
 
As evidenced by the preceding definition, there are five elements to IA:  
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation (see Figure 4).  
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An understanding of each of the elements is necessary to appreciate the scope of the IA 
construct.  The five elements of IA could be described as follows: 
Availability:  information can be accessed when and where required and in the 
proper format 
Integrity:  information is accurate and timely 
Authentication:  information is available only to those who have proof of 
authorization 
Confidentiality:  information is only available to those who require it 
Non-repudiation:  information cannot be forged nor can its origin be denied 
(Maconachy et al., 2001; McKnight, 2002) 
 
The Department of Defense operationalized the IA construct in its formulation of 
the defense-in-depth strategy which has also been widely adopted in the private sector.  
Defense-in-depth takes a truly strategic view of IA in that is advocates a balance between 
capability, cost, performance and operational considerations (National Security Agency, 
2002).  A key principle of defense-in-depth is that IA can only be achieved through the 
interaction of people, technology, and operations.   
While people and operations are clearly important elements in an IA strategy, this 
research deals primarily with the employment of technology to fulfill security 
requirements.  The following illustration describes the interaction between the three 
elements, but also specifies four focus areas that encompass the primary objectives for 
technology in a defense-in-depth strategy:  defend the network and infrastructure, defend 
the enclave boundary, defend the computing environment, and supporting infrastructures. 
Defense-in-depth also specifies five principles that should be followed in order to 
achieve IA:  defense in multiple places, layered defenses, security robustness, deploy 
KMI/PKI (key management infrastructure/public key infrastructure), and deploy 
intrusion detection systems.  By spreading out defense mechanisms throughout the 
44 
 
 
Figure 6:  Defense in Depth Strategy Focus Areas (National Security Agency, 2002: 
2-11) 
infrastructure, organizations are better able to respond to attacks, whether they originate 
from inside or outside the network, or originate from single or multiple sources.  By 
layering defenses, an organization capitalizes on the strengths of multiple protection 
mechanisms, rather than risking damage due to the breach of a single line of defense.  
Security robustness refers to measuring and reporting the level of protection of a specific 
IA component based on its strength to weather attacks and the assurance that it is 
deployed and operated properly.  The last two principles recommend employing specific 
technologies including IDS and KMI/PKI (National Security Agency, 2002).  The 
researcher does not consider these as elements of a strategy, but rather an implementation 
plan. 
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   Summary   
This chapter examined the roots of the intrusion detection discipline within the 
context of the more general computer security discipline.  Chapter Two also traced the 
evolution of intrusion detection from its inception through current research in the field.  
Finally, Chapter Two investigated the concept of information assurance along with its 
associated constructs in order to establish a framework for discussing intrusion detection 
within the context of IA strategy.  In the following chapter, the historical analysis 
methodology is explored. 
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III.  Methodology 
   Chapter Overview   
Chapter Three explores the historical analysis methodology and the inherent value 
of historical research.  This chapter will present various constructs relating to 
historiography proposed by previous researchers in MIS as well as general management 
and business.  Furthermore, the researcher will provide justification for employing this 
methodology in the context of the problem proposed in Chapter One. 
   The Importance of History   
“History is the witness that testifies to the passing of time: it illumines 
reality, vitalizes memory provides guidance in daily life and brings us tidings of 
antiquity.” (Cicero) 
 
Despite advocacy by great minds such as Cicero, the historical perspective is one 
that has been sparsely employed in information systems (IS) research.  Bannister wrote 
that rigorous historiographies in IS research are scarce (2002).  Still, historical 
perspectives can provide significant insight into contemporary situations.   
According to Leedy and Ormrod, history itself is nothing more than a collection 
of events and changes in the human condition (2001).  Historical research, however, tries 
to make sense of these events and changes and assign to them a greater meaning (Leedy 
and Ormrod, 2001).  This process fosters edification.  According to Mason et al., the 
great economist Joseph Schumpeter asserted that for any field of study to be considered a 
discipline, it must provide “ (1) empirical data, observations and facts, (2) theories and 
paradigms, (3) ethics, and (4) history” (1997a:257-258).  The authors expanded, “history 
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is necessary to provide a temporal and contextual meaning for each of the other three 
forms of knowledge” (Mason et al., 1997a:258).  Parallel to this concept, O’Brien et al., 
stated that knowledge is only effective when it is contextualized, and that history is the 
vehicle by which we obtain contextualization (2004).  Ergo, the value of the historical 
method is in the power of the past to enlighten the present. 
   The Historical Method   
As the value of history has been unequivocally stated, it is also necessary to 
explore the discipline-specific approaches to historiography in IS research.  The existing 
approaches can best be explained by a discussion of the various works and their 
associated constructs relating to the historical method. 
The approach proposed by Mason et al. incorporated two constructs that could be 
used to investigate the evolution of IS within an organization.  The first construct dealt 
with the roles of specific individuals in affecting the organizational evolution and 
attainment of a dominant design, a new configuration of technology, strategy, and 
structure which gives the organization a competitive advantage.  As this research does not 
focus on individuals per se’, this construct will not be employed during the course of the 
analysis.  The second proposed construct, the cascade, describes five evolutionary phases 
of an organization following the recognition of a crisis (Mason et al., 1997a).  These five 
phases are illustrated in Figure 6.  Bannister, however, noted that this approach is 
constrained by the assumption of a major crisis provoking the organization to action.  He 
argued that not all organizations achieve dominant design after negotiating major crises.   
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Figure 7: The Cascade (Mason, McKenney, & Copeland, 1997a:267) 
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Rather, Bannister followed Greiner’s rationale that organizations continuously tackle 
crises on a regular basis (2002).  This researcher believes that these crises, or 
opportunities depending on your perspective, prompt organizations to continually adjust 
their dominant design to meet the needs of their environment. 
 In a supporting work, Mason et al. fielded a seven-step process for engaging the 
historical method.  The seven steps proposed are: 
1) Begin with focusing questions—specify those related areas to be 
addressed in the course of research 
2) Specify the domain—determine the range of events that pertain to the 
research question(s) 
3) Gather evidence—provides material for historical interpretation and 
contextualization 
4) Critique the evidence—sources are screened for their reliability and 
relevance 
5) Determine patterns—emergent patterns and theories are codified 
6) Tell the story—the account; present the evidence in a manner 
consistent with reality 
7) Write the transcript—conclusions are placed in context with existing 
schemas (Mason et al., 1997b:312-317) 
Mason attested that these steps do not require stringent adherence and the phases often 
overlap (1997b).  Such is the nature of historical research, a dynamic process that 
requires many revisits to properly contextualize the topic in question. 
O’Brien et al. proposed a similar framework for use in business and management 
studies.  This framework, while comparable to that proposed by Mason, contains a nine-
step process outlined below: 
1) Develop research question—ensure that the topic is robust to 
historiography, interesting, defensible, feasible 
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2) Relevance check—researcher must ensure usefulness of historical 
perspective 
3) Scope of the research—define the domain associated with the focusing 
question(s) 
4) Sources of evidence—identify valuable/reliable data sources 
5) Assess methods of analysis—researcher must decide on qualitative, 
quantitative, or hybrid approach to analysis 
6) Assemble the evidence—researcher must sift sources to ensure 
reliability/accuracy 
7) Develop the story—requires identification of emergent patterns and 
interpretation of facts; answer the what, how , and why 
8) Critique the story—ensure that the evidence has been critically 
evaluated and presents a persuasive argument 
9) Outcome of the research—communicate the conclusions of the 
research, including limitations and implications (O’Brien et al., 2004: 
138-141) 
On close examination of each of these frameworks, convergence between the two 
authors is transparent.  While the two approaches are not completely synchronous, each is 
robust to addressing the research at hand and provides a foundational framework from 
which to engage the problems proposed in chapter one.  The Mason framework provides 
value in that it espouses an organizational perspective for understanding how IT is 
introduced and the factors that contribute to or constrain its usefulness.  The O’Brien 
framework, on the other hand, does not limit its usefulness specifically to IT as it applies 
to general business and management.  Due to the focus of this research, that of providing 
a strategic understanding of a particular technology for use by executives in making 
business and management decisions, it seemed intuitive that a synthesis of the two 
frameworks would be useful and applicable to this study.  The researcher identified 
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parallel concepts between the two constructs in order to formulate the synthesis, which is 
illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Mason et al. (1997b) Mason-O'Brien Synthesis O'Brien et al. (2004) 
                  
Begin with focusing questions Develop focusing questions 
            
Develop research question 
Relevance check 
Specify the domain   Determine scope   Scope of the research 
Gather evidence   Gather and review evidence Sources of evidence   
            Assess methods of analysis 
Critique the evidence   Critique evidence         
      Assemble evidence   Assemble the evidence 
Determine patterns   Identify emergent patterns Develop the story   
            Critique the story   
Tell the story   Convey results   Outcome of the research 
Write the transcript               
Figure 8: Mason-O'Brien Synthesis 
 
   Justifying an Historical Analysis   
As alluded to previously, historical research provides a valuable lens through 
which to perceive substantive phenomena.  Knowledge and comprehension of past events 
sheds light on present circumstances and enables the creation of mental models for future 
situations.  In the context of information systems, historiography is capable of 
illuminating those circumstances that affected the introduction of technology to address 
practical issues. 
While historiographies are relatively underutilized in IS research, they play a 
valuable role regardless.  Mason, McKenney, & Copeland stated, “Historical analyses 
broaden our understanding of the processes by which information technology is 
introduced into organizations and of the forces that shape its use” (1997a:257).  
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Furthermore, the authors identified three specific products of historical analyses that are 
of analytical value in IS research: 
1) First is an account of a significant fragment of the past describing 
events of importance to the MIS community which also provides 
contextual material for understanding other events 
2) Second , the historical account can be used as data in a broad process 
of inductive reasoning 
3) Third, the research may serve as the source of new research 
hypotheses (Mason et al, 1997b:308-309) 
Bannister concurred with Mason et al, but he added that historical research is also 
profitable for validation or falsification of existing theory (2002). 
While Mason et al. proposed historical analysis as a valuable apparatus for 
understanding organizations, this methodology can also offer significant insight for 
understanding other entities.  O’Brien et al. proposed that researchers may choose 
organizations, individuals, or industries as units of analysis during the scoping of the 
subject matter; hence, historical analysis is appropriately applied to the ID discipline in 
this research (2004). 
   Limitations of the Historical Method   
As with any methodology, there are inherent constraints which the researcher 
must acknowledge and strive to minimize.  First and foremost, historical research, 
according to O’Brien et al., is “highly interpretist and the findings are often thought to be 
more personal than some researchers are comfortable with” (2004:143).  As such 
subjectivity is introduced, it must be foremost in the researcher’s mind to focus as much 
energy as possible in interpreting factual information.  Still, as Leedy and Ormrod point 
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out, it is nearly impossible for researchers to avoid working with data contaminated by 
bias.  What is important, though, is that the possible presence of bias be acknowledged, 
and in the case of historiography, this is arguably a greater possibility than in other 
methodologies (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). 
A second limitation with the historical method is the possible incompleteness of 
historical data.  Elton says that in employing this method, the researcher becomes “a 
servant of his evidence,” according to O’Brien et al. (2004:139).  O’ Brien also noted that 
more often than not, the historical researcher is not working from complete information.  
This implies that the researcher, in order to maintain the integrity of the inquiry, must 
continually refine his evidence according to an espoused sense of credibility and 
reliability.  Furthermore, some evidence will meet the acceptance criteria for one 
researcher where another would discount the same source (O’Brien et al., 2004). 
   Summary   
This chapter discussed the proposed historical research methodology.  It discussed 
the importance of history in general as well as the value of historical research in 
particular to the IS discipline.  Chapter Three outlined two approaches to historical 
research and noted their similarities and followed with an exploration of the proposed 
constructs corresponding to each approach.  Furthermore, this chapter presented a 
justification for this approach within the context of the IS discipline and specifically 
within this research effort.  Finally, the author identified possible limitations of the 
historical research method. 
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IV. Findings 
 
   Chapter Overview   
Chapter Three described the historical research methodology and provided 
justification for its use in resolving the investigative questions posed in Chapter One.  
This chapter communicates the results of the historical analysis as applied to the factual 
data presented in the literature review. 
   Addressing the Investigative Questions   
This section specifically addresses the three investigative questions posed in 
Chapter One.  By answering these questions, IS/IT executives will be better able to 
understand the background of intrusion detection and its related technologies.  
Furthermore, by contextualizing the IDS discipline, IS/IT executives will be better 
informed to make strategic decisions regarding the employment of intrusion detection 
within their respective business domains. 
The methodology employed to address these questions was based on a synergy of 
the historical approaches proposed by Mason, McKenney, & Copeland in 1997 and 
O’Brien, Remenyi and Keaney in 2004.  In establishing the existence of the problem, the 
researcher developed the focusing questions and scoped the research primarily by 
becoming familiar with the subject matter and the established history of intrusion 
detection.  This focusing of the research was followed by an initial review of the 
historical data and seminal works within intrusion detection.  Following the initial 
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review, the researcher critiqued the evidence based on applicability and relevance to the 
focusing questions and led to the identification of additional sources.  Then, the 
researcher assembled the relevant evidence to tell the historical account which 
subsequently allows emergent patterns to develop and be identified.  The last step of the 
synergized methodology is to convey the results of the research.  This will be 
accomplished by addressing the investigative questions with respect to the manner in 
which they were presented in Chapter One. 
   Investigative Question #1:  What factors led to the emergence of intrusion detection 
as a discipline?   
The first of the three investigative questions posed in response to the problems 
identified in Chapter One was that of identifying those factors which led to the 
emergence of the intrusion detection discipline.  It stands to reason that any matter of 
inquiry that has effloresced into an academic discipline must serve a purpose and provide 
contribution to the general body of knowledge.  In answering this question, the researcher 
hopes to shed light on the reasons for which this discipline appeared and provide clarity 
as to whether the discipline has or has not outlived its purpose as concluded by Gartner 
(2003). 
By applying the cascade construct as a vectoring tool, the data identified three 
factors which contributed to the emergence of the intrusion detection discipline: 
I. Increased acquisition and usage of resource-sharing systems in the 
Department of Defense 
II. Growing need to employ resource-sharing systems within an open 
computing environment while maintaining security 
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III. Unmanageable volume of audit data being produced 
These three factors interact to form the crisis that led to intrusion detection developing 
into its own academic discipline. 
   Investigative Question #2:  How has IDS research evolved since its inception?   
Now that the research has identified the circumstances underlying the emergence 
of the intrusion detection discipline, it is now necessary to explore how the discipline has 
evolved since its inception in order to adequately contextualize the topic under study. 
Six trends were identified that could be used to describe the evolution of IDS 
research from its inception through current research: 
I. From passive to active response mechanisms 
II. From centralized to distributed analysis 
III. From centralized to distributed/agent-based collection 
IV. From single to multiple detection approaches within a system 
V. From host-based analysis to network-based analysis to hybrid analysis 
VI. From software-based systems to hardware appliances/in-line devices  
These six trends provide granularity for comprehending the growth of the ID discipline in 
depth and breadth over time.  In answering the first two investigative questions, the 
research has provided contextual data for understanding the inception and evolution of 
intrusion detection systems.  The results of the first two investigative questions as well as 
the contextual data used to address them were then synthesized to address the final 
investigative question. 
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   Investigative Question #3:  What specific roles, if any, are IDS’s suited to fulfill 
within a holistic information assurance program?   
While it is clear that IDS on its own does not currently possess the capability to 
detect all known and unknown intrusions, this research shows that, when strategically 
employed, IDS can serve a significant purpose within the context of the information 
assurance construct.  As far as the five pillars of IA, intrusion detection can be 
categorized as supporting, to some degree, all of the primary elements.  For example, IDS 
supports confidentiality by reporting when a user has accessed certain privileges typically 
afforded to administrators or when those privileges have been employed beyond a 
predetermined normal threshold.  This particular example also shows evidence of 
supporting integrity (e.g. IDS may aid in identifying resources that the attacker gained 
access to) and authentication (e.g. anomaly detectors allow profiles of usage to be created 
which can highlight intrusive behavior).  Another example would be IDS supporting 
availability by indicating when a network is being targeted for denial-of-service attacks 
and non-repudiation by logging the origin of the attack.  Clearly, due to the design 
constraints of intrusion detection systems, it may not be possible to provide support for 
all elements of the IA construct all the time.  As such, the technology is properly 
designated a supporting infrastructure within the defense-in-depth strategy.  However, the 
researcher does feel it is necessary to point out the contradictory nature of identifying 
specific technologies to be employed when articulating organizational strategy.   
With respect to the defense-in-depth operational strategy, certain principles in IA 
clearly support overlap and redundancy in the deployment of protection mechanisms, 
specifically, defense in multiple places and layered defenses.  No one security technology 
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is capable of effectively shielding an entire network from all possible attack scenarios.  
Therefore, IDS when employed strategically is just another tool in the toolbox to 
achieving information assurance.  Furthermore, the IA construct appears to advocate IDS 
in its inclusion of “protection, detection and reaction capabilities” (Maconachy et al., 
2001:307) which support system restoration following an attack.  With this in mind, the 
research identified three primary roles that intrusion detection systems are capable of 
fulfilling within the context of information assurance.   
I. Intrusion detection can be useful as a stimulus to actuate a predefined 
response mechanism 
II. IDS can be used to gather, organize, and correlate evidence in the 
investigation of computer misuse 
III. IDS can be employed as a vulnerability assessment/policy enforcement 
tool 
The role that IDS is able to fulfill ultimately depends on the objectives of the 
organization employing the technology.  One organization may wish to furnish forensic 
evidence to law enforcement officials in order to aid in prosecution of a computer crime 
while another may wish to simply block intrusions and prevent further damage.  
Furthermore, these roles are not mutually exclusive.  If so inclined, it is possible for an 
organization to deploy IDS such that it fulfills all of these roles in concert. 
   A Synthesis   
The overarching goal of this research effort was to provide IS/IT managers 
guidance regarding the utility of intrusion detection systems within the framework of 
59 
 
information assurance.  The method chosen to accomplish this objective was historical 
analysis due to the contextualizing value that this methodology provides. 
Past researchers in IDS have proposed that the commercial success of IDS 
technology has been contingent upon a bandwagon effect.  Organizations implemented 
the technology without a strategic perspective on its capabilities and limitations.  IDS 
investment decisions were based on novelty rather than feasibility.  This has led to 
relative frustration with solutions that fail to deliver what executives thought would be 
delivered.  In many cases, IDS was viewed as a total solution to information security 
problems.   
The question of deploying IDS is not answered with a binary response.  By 
providing insight on how the discipline began and describing the evolution of intrusion 
detection, this research gives managers a more realistic understanding of the capabilities 
and limitations of IDS technology.  While this knowledge alone may have better prepared 
organizations to deal with the confounding issues in implementing IDS, this research 
further proposes specific roles that IDS technologies are suited to address within an IA 
strategy.  This knowledge and understanding of IDS technologies prepares executives to 
make more informed decisions regarding the usefulness of IDS technologies within their 
own organizations.   
   Summary   
Chapter Four outlined the results obtained by applying historical research 
techniques to the topic of intrusion detection.  This chapter discussed the three 
investigative questions posed in Chapter One and provided conclusions based on an 
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application of the historical research methodology.  The final chapter contains a summary 
of the research findings and proposes practical implications and recommendations for 
future research.
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V.  Summary, Implications, and Recommendations 
 
   Summary   
This research investigated the historical background and circumstances that led to 
the birth of the intrusion detection field and explored the evolution of the discipline 
through current research in order to identify appropriate roles for IDS technology within 
an information assurance framework.  The research identified factors contributing to the 
birth of ID including increased procurement and employment of resource-sharing 
computer systems in the DoD, a growing need to operate in an open computing 
environment while maintaining security and the unmanageable volume of audit data 
produced as a result of security requirements.  The research also uncovered six trends that 
could be used to describe the evolution of the ID discipline encompassing passive to 
active response mechanisms, centralized to distributed management platforms, 
centralized to distributed/agent-based detection, single to multiple detection approaches 
within a system, host-based to network to hybrid analysis and software-based to 
hardware-based/in-line devices.  Finally, the research outlined three non-mutually 
exclusive roles suitable for IDS to fulfill within the IA framework including employing 
IDS as a stimulus to incident response mechanisms, as a forensic tool for gathering 
evidence of computer misuse and as a vulnerability assessment or policy enforcement 
facility. 
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   Practical Implications   
The primary contribution of this research is in supplying IS/IT executives and 
Chief Information/Security Officers with a usable framework with which to make 
strategic decisions to deploy intrusion detection systems.  It is beyond the scope of this 
research to determine whether or not IDS is appropriate for a given organization.  This is 
a decision that must be appropriated to ranking executives who possess the corresponding 
strategic perspective required to assess the suitability of the technology.  However, the 
research concluded that IDS is robust to addressing specific roles should corporate 
strategy dictate their relevance.   
The historical analysis provides a distinct perspective that can be used to 
contextualize the current state of the intrusion detection discipline.  Furthermore, it 
provides executives with an understanding of not only the limitations of the technology 
but how those limitations developed over time.  This knowledge alone supplies managers 
with a powerful tool for gauging investments in current and evolved forms of the IDS 
paradigm such as intrusion prevention systems or intrusion detection and prevention 
solutions.  Thus, this research effort may aid in formulating long-term strategies for 
employing IDS technologies or not employing them, depending on organizational 
objectives. 
While the technology is a central focus of this research, it is important to note that 
a holistic information assurance strategy includes both personnel and organizational 
issues in addition to technology.  Because current IDS technology is not yet able to 
completely replace the security analyst, it becomes paramount for executives to acquire 
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and train skilled personnel to interact with IDS systems as well as align organizational 
structures to garner the greatest effectiveness from IDS technologies.  Thus, executives 
must continually weigh personnel issues in their strategic employment of IDS 
technology. 
The researcher does believe, in contrast to Gartner, that accuracy in future IDS 
implementations will realize sufficient improvement as to allow more active response 
capabilities.  Detection accuracy improvements will only be realized, however, when 
security technology vendors implement standards for the exchange of security 
information.  By fusing security information from the entire gamut of security 
technologies, detection will occur quicker and with ever-increasing accuracy.  As such, 
executives should actively pursue bolstering their infrastructures with interoperable 
technologies.  By coupling interoperability with advanced visualization tools, security 
personnel will be postured to take calculated action to repel and recover from malicious 
attacks.  
   Recommendations for Future Research   
As this was an exploratory study, and highly interpretist, a similar study on the 
same topic may yield different results.  However, should another researcher, surveying a 
similar body of literature, arrive at comparable conclusions, greater validity could be 
attributed to this research effort.  Furthermore, future research may identify other roles 
for which intrusion detection is appropriate within the IA framework of protective 
measures. 
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Future research could also focus on describing how current organizations actually 
employ IDS with respect to the roles identified in this inquiry.  By identifying which 
roles IDS fulfills more often in practice, IT decision-makers could be better suited to 
weigh decisions on IDS investment.  Along the same lines, individual implementations of 
IDS technology could be evaluated on their ability to perform within the context of the 
roles identified in this research. 
Another beneficial future research effort would be a cross-disciplinary effort 
between IDS researchers and behavioral scientists.  As this effort and others have shown, 
the detection problem is largely due to a lack of foundational research in modeling 
intrusive and normal behaviors during human-computer interaction.  Intuitively, it would 
seem obvious to borrow from the behavioral sciences, which are much more adept at 
modeling human behavior, to address this gap in IDS research. 
Another possible avenue for further investigation would be the effect of 
technology convergence within the framework of IA.  As IDS, firewall, antivirus, and 
vulnerability assessment technologies converge, it would be fruitful to investigate the 
effects of this synergy on organizational IA strategies.  The effect would be particularly 
interesting in light of the defense-in-depth principles of layering and distributing defenses 
throughout the network.  Furthermore, some of the evidence seemed to present a trend 
toward enterprise security solutions provided by commercial ISP’s for their customers.  
These services are often transparent to the user and could include intrusion detection, 
anti-virus, spam filtering, and spyware detection and removal services.  An exploratory 
study into the extent and nature of this trend may yield beneficial results. 
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